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I.    INTRODUCTION 
In Carpenter v. United States,1 the Supreme Court held that one has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in cell site location information (CSLI).2  
In contrast to prior judicial direction,3 law enforcement must now obtain a 
search warrant whenever they seek more than six days of CSLI from a cell 
phone service provider regarding a customer’s whereabouts.4  The Court 
reasoned that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment because the 
accumulated historical record of a citizen’s movements is privacy-sensitive.5  
In so doing, the Court addressed the growing concern among Americans 
that the government can, and will, invade privacy through novel surveillance 
techniques.6 
 
1. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
2. Id. at 2217. 
3. See In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(deferring cellular data privacy questions to the voters); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 
(11th Cir. 2015) (holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI). 
4. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212, 2217. 
5. Id. at 2221. 
6. See id. at 2219–20 (remarking on the dissent’s failure to contend with the “seismic shifts in 
digital technology”); see also Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), 
2
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These concerns do not flow from unwarranted public hysteria.  Federal 
agencies have reached the pinnacle of notoriety for singling out groups and 
individuals for surveillance and other harassment.7  Generally applicable 
surveillance has generated a great deal of controversy as well.8  Even when 
people realize their information is exchanged among multiple third parties, 
there is an understanding that information will be used according to the 
terms of service and not shared with a non-marketplace data broker.9 
In many cases, third parties will stand up for user privacy when the 
government subpoenas customer information, but nondisclosure of user 
data is not guaranteed.10  Until Carpenter, a cell phone user had no right to 
challenge a subpoena of CSLI because the data was said to belong to the 
service provider.11  Thus, the user is at the mercy of the third-party service 
provider.  Law enforcement has the element of surprise against the 
unwitting user (investigated party) who is not necessarily entitled to know—
and even less likely to become apprised—of a request to sift through the 
 
https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/J5PZ-88NG] (highlighting consumer 
concerns should Apple comply with FBI demands to produce surveillance software). 
7. See Peter Fenn, Opinion, Time to Clean House at the CIA, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2014, 11:10 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-fenn/2014/08/01/fire-cias-john-brennan-after-
senate-spying-scandal [https://perma.cc/K7EJ-FWV3] (chronicling the efforts of Senators Udall and 
Wyden to curb the CIA after the agency lied about spying on Congress); Editorial, The IRS Targets 
Conservatives, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2013, at A14 (discussing IRS harassment of conservative non-profit 
organizations); S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 12–18 (Comm. Print 1976), (exposing the FBI’s domestic 
surveillance and harassment of advocacy groups and civil rights leaders, media manipulation, 
threatening of controversial professors and writers, and reading American mail supplied by the CIA); 
cf. Memorandum from Michael Horowitz, Inspector Gen., Dept. of Justice, to Christopher Wray, Dir., 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation 1 (Sept. 25, 2017) (describing “systemic issues” within the FBI such as 
multiple failed polygraph tests). 
8. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 2015) (detailing the privacy concerns of the 
ACLU in the bulk collection of metadata on nearly all Americans); Eyder Peralta, NSA Ends 
Sept. 11-Era Surveillance Program, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 29, 2015, 2:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/thetwo-way/2015/11/29/457779757/nsa-ends-sept-11th-era-surveillance-program 
[https://perma.cc/4H7L-ZUHB] (reporting the demise of bulk metadata collection amid public 
privacy outcry). 
9. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (opining 
it may be time to reconsider the notion that one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information conveyed to third-parties for limited purposes). 
10. See Cook, supra note 6 (refusing to build a surveillance backdoor into iPhones for the FBI). 
11. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (denying a defendant has a legal interest 
in third-party-owned business records); In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 
610 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing the government’s ability to subpoena a third-party in possession of 
records an individual knowingly exposes to the third-party). 
3
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user’s bank records, phone metadata, and search queries.12  In contrast to 
searches of buildings, objects, or persons, the user will not have even the 
slightest opportunity to destroy evidence of criminal activity.13  While no 
one questions the probative value of CSLI, there is a growing consensus 
that current privacy law is inadequate.  Some jurists have suggested that the 
third-party doctrine, under which a person has no expectation of privacy in 
information conveyed to another, should be relaxed to permit the expansion 
of privacy rights.14 
With this power and leverage comes the necessity of discipline and 
oversight in law enforcement and other government agencies.  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to stop invasions of privacy before the damage 
is effected.15  Where surveillance techniques are unduly intrusive or occur 
over an extensive time period, many, including a plurality of the Supreme 
Court, believe such abusive state action should be proscribed by the 
Fourth Amendment.16  Under this theory, during a criminal prosecution, 
the exclusionary evidence rule proscribes the admission of evidence 
procured through an unreasonable search, and discourages law enforcement 
from trying to obtain information without a warrant.17 
 
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(3) (2012) (providing law enforcement with the ability to obtain a gag 
order against a computing service when customer communications are subpoenaed and where denial 
may result in the destruction of evidence); 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (forbidding banks from notifying 
customers whose transactions have been reported to authorities as suspicious); see also DAVID GRAY, 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 86–89 (2017) (demonstrating the 
frequency at which the third-party doctrine is cited to obtain customer information from banking 
institutions and companies). 
13. See United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (approving 
nondisclosure order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) because disclosure would potentially jeopardize 
an ongoing government investigation). 
14. See Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 95 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (refusing 
to adopt a “wooden” version of the Fourth Amendment that permits the government to circumvent 
search warrants for patron’s bank records through a subpoena). 
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (creating a tort for deprivation of constitutional rights by law 
enforcement); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658–59 (1961) (mandating that evidence procured through 
a Fourth Amendment violation be excluded from evidence). 
16. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (disagreeing 
with the proposition that secrecy is a prerequisite to enjoying privacy); id. at 429–31 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (concluding new non-physical surveillance technologies justify extending the 
Fourth Amendment to proscribe long-term surveillance without a warrant); cf. Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (rejecting the government’s contention that searching with a thermal imaging 
device that does not physically penetrate a home is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment). 
17. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398–99 (1914) (reversing a conviction in federal 
court based on evidence acquired through an illegal search and seizure). 
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Subscribers to this school of thought applauded when the Court 
announced its decision to extend Fourth Amendment protections to CSLI, 
but it remains to be seen whether this extension was proper as a matter of 
law.  In extending the Fourth Amendment’s coverage to Mr. Carpenter’s 
CSLI, the Court reasoned that although the third-party doctrine usually 
precludes a reasonable expectation of privacy in records created and owned 
by third parties, CSLI data presents peculiar challenges to an individual’s 
privacy rights in his physical movements.18  The Court drew a line between 
CSLI data and the subpoena of bank records and telephone call metadata as 
areas in which one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.19 
The Court’s unexplained delineation recalls to mind a number of 
Chief Justice Roberts’s other decisions which have pushed legal boundaries 
in a contrarian manner.20  Carpenter should have been a straightforward 
case,21 as information owned by a third-party is normally accessible via 
subpoena duces tecum.22  Alternatively, the subpoena of Mr. Carpenter’s 
CSLI was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment under 
either the reasonable expectation of privacy test (REOP test) or traditional 
trespass analysis.23  Yet, Carpenter represents a watershed moment24 in the 
legal history of the Fourth Amendment because it radically departs from 
three legal doctrines and creates a confusing and unworkable test.  While 
the Court attempted to protect the average American’s normative 
 
18. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (blocking unlimited access to 
CSLI due to the “deeply revealing nature of CSLI”). 
19. Id. at 2216–19. 
20. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013–14 (2015) (refusing to completely answer 
the question of what minimum level of culpability will sustain a conviction for terroristic threats and 
chiding Justices Alito and Thomas for their concern that Chief Justice Roberts potentially made the 
job of circuit courts more confusing); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2490, 2495–96, (2015) 
(clarifying that “state” under the Affordable Care Act does not mean one of the United States, while 
also complicating the two-step Chevron doctrine); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 
589 (2012) (upholding a law mandating the purchase of health insurance because the term “penalty” 
actually meant tax). 
21. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
22. See Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc. 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984) (declaring the validity of 
subpoenas for corporate books and other records “settled” law). 
23. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that even if it was a search, 
it was not an “‘actual search’ controlled by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” (quoting 
majority at 2221)). 
24.  Daniel Solove, The Supreme Court on Smart Phones: An Interview of Bart Huffman About Law  
and Technology, LINKEDIN (Sept. 23, 2018) https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/supreme-court-smart-
phones-interview-bart-huffman-law-daniel-solove [https://perma.cc/UJK6-ZQJZ] [hereinafter 
Solove]. 
5
Stone: Saving America’s Privacy Rights
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020
  
228 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:223 
expectation of privacy, the Court instead, in a result-oriented decision, 
reached beyond a fair exegesis of the Fourth Amendment and precedent to 
provide only modest privacy protection under the bright-line rule that 
requesting less than seven days of CSLI without a warrant does not run afoul 
of the Constitution.25 
This Comment will address why Carpenter should have come to a different 
conclusion under the three aforementioned legal frameworks and seeks to 
provide the proper course for the Court to follow in order to both correctly 
interpret the law and promote the expansion of privacy protection.  This 
Comment also takes the opportunity to reconsider the Katz v. United States26 
line of cases that led the Carpenter Court to reach its decision.  If Carpenter 
and its Katz-jurisprudence predecessors incorrectly interpreted the law and 
insufficiently served the privacy interests for which they were created, the 
time is nigh to resolve privacy law, an area that characteristically lags behind 
the times.27  As will be discussed in greater detail, the Court’s historical 
attempts to patch the Fourth Amendment inadequately comport with the 
normative expectation of privacy held by the public.  It follows that 
constitutional and statutory change is the proper remedy to the problem of 
privacy in the digital era. 
The Carpenter test may one day be relegated to abstract theory, rarely 
applied, much like the establishment clause test in Lemon v. Kurtzman.28  In 
the interim, however, the metaphorical floodgates of litigation are open, and 
law enforcement, jurists, and even lawyers have little guidance to ascertain 
whether information owned by a third party is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.  The ultimate question in future Fourth Amendment 
cases addressing third-party-owned information will be whether the 
information is more like CSLI data or other forms clearly excepted from the 
 
25. As will be discussed infra Part III.A, one does not normally have an expectation of privacy 
in information belonging to third parties, but even if it does, the Supreme Court does not clarify why 
six days is the magic number.  In a robbery case, like the one in Carpenter, the probative value of six 
days of information would likely be outweighed by the privacy intrusion if the suspect was far away 
from the crime scene on the day he was suspected of committing the crime.  In such a scenario, one 
day is the focus, and the other days become potentially relevant only if the first day’s records are 
inculpatory. 
26. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
27. See Solove, supra note 24 (“[T]he Court struggles with how to incorporate the dominating 
characteristics of today’s information technology within the doctrines of Constitutional law.”). 
28. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 
686 (2005) (noting that within two years of the Lemon test’s creation, the Court recognized the test 
factors only as signposts and otherwise declined to apply the test). 
6
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scope of the Fourth Amendment in prior cases.29  This question is the 
blurry line drawn by the Court, but that is the road paved by Carpenter.30 
II.    A HISTORY OF THE FACTS AND LAW LEADING TO CARPENTER 
A. A Summary of the Facts in Carpenter 
The Carpenter case arose out of an interstate robbery spree ironically 
involving cell phone stores.31  An accomplice to the criminal enterprise 
identified Mr. Carpenter as one of the robbers and provided Mr. Carpenter’s 
cell phone number to the authorities.32  Law enforcement then applied for 
a subpoena under the Stored Communications Act (SCA)33 for 
Mr. Carpenter’s CSLI.34  To obtain a subpoena under the Act, the 
authorities only had to demonstrate specific and articulable facts indicating 
reasonable grounds that the information sought was relevant to a criminal 
investigation.35 
The authorities met the burden of proof for the subpoena, a standard less 
burdensome than probable cause,36 and subsequently acquired several 
months’ worth of Mr. Carpenter’s CSLI.37  Although CSLI data is generally 
not as precise as GPS data, the information derived can prove that an 
individual was within several miles of a site covered by a cellular tower.38  
In Mr. Carpenter’s case, his cell phone pinged the cell towers near the 
location of four of the robberies.39  Because CSLI data provides a window 
into the general area of an individual’s location at a particular time,40 law 
enforcement was able to track all of Mr. Carpenter’s movements during the 
 
29. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2234 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 2212 (majority opinion). 
32. Id. 
33. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
34. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
35. § 2703(d), declared unconstitutional in part by Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (“[T]he Government 
must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring [CSLI].”). 
36. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (recognizing the Stored Communications Act only requires 
evidence pertinent to an ongoing investigation rather than “some quantum of individualized suspicion” 
under a probable cause standard (quoting United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61 
(1976))). 
37. Id. 
38. See id. at 2226 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing the degree to which CLSI pinpoints an 
individual’s location). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 2217 (majority opinion). 
7
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timeframe of the robberies.41  The cumulative data also revealed the 
frequency with which Mr. Carpenter visited particular areas.42  Based on the 
circumstantial evidence, Mr. Carpenter was arrested and later convicted.43 
B. Three Approaches the Supreme Court Could Have Used in Carpenter 
The Court had three approaches it could have used to decide Carpenter.44  
The threshold Fourth Amendment question is whether a search or seizure 
has occurred.45  The easiest approach to resolve the case would have been 
under the traditional subpoena duces tecum analysis.46  The alternatives for 
ascertaining the legality of searches are the trespass test47 and the REOP 
test.48  In the end, the Court chose a hybrid version of the REOP test that 
emphasized the novelty of recovering an individual’s CSLI data through the 
issuance of a subpoena.49 
Before one even considers the thorny question of searches in Carpenter, it 
is important to consider the distinction between subpoenas and searches.50  
In his dissenting opinion in Carpenter, Justice Alito posits that, while 
subpoenas are subject to some Fourth Amendment limitations, they are 
categorically different from searches.51  Searches are much more invasive 
and require probable cause, while subpoenas are constructive searches 
subject to less judicial scrutiny.52  Subpoenas follow the common law 
 
41. Id. at 2226 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
42. Id. at 2212–13 (majority opinion). 
43. Id. at 2213. 
44. See id. at 2257–60 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the three tests previously used in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
45. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (restating the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition on “unreasonable” searches and seizures). 
46. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to uphold traditional 
subpoena analysis and “more than a century of Supreme Court precedent.”). 
47. Cf. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751–54 (1952) (declining to extend 
Fourth Amendment protections under a claim of trespass by eavesdropping because the federal agent 
did not physically enter petitioner’s business by force, unwilling submission to authority, or without 
express or implied consent). 
48. See, e.g., Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1522 (2018) (conceptualizing the reasonable 
expectation of privacy as a logical extension of property law’s “right to exclude others”). 
49. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (majority opinion) (placing limitations on subpoenas where 
a suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in the information sought). 
50. Cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204–11 (1946) (recognizing the 
confusion between the distinct areas of actual searches and constructive searches via subpoena duces 
tecum). 
51. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2256 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
52. Id. at 2247. 
8
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understanding that a court has a right to any useful evidence.53  The case 
could have been decided under the law governing subpoenas before diving 
into the depths of the Fourth Amendment search doctrine.54  Nevertheless, 
the Court declined to base its judgment on the differences between 
subpoenas and searches.55 
C. A History of Fourth Amendment Search Doctrine 
Carpenter is the first of its kind in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  To 
understand this case, one must first explore the history of this Amendment 
and cases interpreting it over the years.  In common parlance today, the 
Fourth Amendment is the point of reference every time one invokes the 
right to privacy, but the extent to which this is true is a matter of debate.56 
For much of America’s history, few cases have addressed the 
Fourth Amendment’s implications or even its provenance.57  The first 
serious study of the Amendment occurred in the post-Civil War Era in 
Boyd v. United States,58 which narrated the history leading up to its 
enactment.59  In the eighteenth century, agents of the British monarchy 
were notorious for searching the houses, papers, and personal effects of its 
subjects using general warrants.60  This generated a public outcry 
 
53. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279–82 (1919) (reciting a litany of cases proving the 
longstanding validity of subpoenas under the common law and quoting Lord Bacon as remarking “[a]ll 
subjects, without distinction of degrees, owe to the King tribute and service, not only of their deed and 
hand, but of their knowledge and discovery.”); see also Amey v. Long [1808] 103 Eng. Rep. 653, 653; 
9 East 472, 473 (acknowledging the subpoena’s compulsory nature and lawful effect); cf. Carpenter, 
138 S. Ct. at 2249 (Alito, J., dissenting) (pointing to the Judiciary Act of 1789 as codifying the courts 
ability to compel useful evidence from parties). 
54. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2256–57 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“For over a hundred years, we 
have understood that holding subpoenas to the same standard as actual searches and seizures ‘would 
stop much if not all of investigation in the public interest at the threshold of inquiry.’” (quoting 
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213 (1946))). 
55. Id. at 2221–22 (majority opinion). 
56. Cf. id. at 2243–44 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (reiterating the unfamiliar territory of technology 
and whether invoking the Fourth Amendment is reasonable in such circumstances). 
57. See ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 2 (1975) (“Except for the Boyd case, virtually no search and seizure cases were decided by the 
Supreme Court in the first 110 years of [the United States’] existence under the Constitution, that is, 
up to the year 1900.”). 
58. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
59. Id. at 624–30. 
60. Id. 
9
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throughout the British Empire.61  Particularly in Colonial America, the 
Crown often granted general search warrants known as writs of assistance 
to its officials, especially customs officers.62  The cost of the Seven Years’ 
War meant that the American colonies would be managed under direct-rule 
to a greater extent than in previous years.63  The Crown turned to its 
colonies for tax revenue.64  The warrants were indefinite and allowed minor 
officers of the British Empire to invade the property interests of the public 
at will.65  Each writ of assistance lasted for the life of the King and expired 
shortly after his death.66 
Searches then, as they are now, could be considerably invasive and even 
destructive.67  The English common law resisted the search and seizure 
tactics of early law enforcement against dissident voices and other perceived 
enemies of the Crown.68  Joseph Story wrote that the Fourth Amendment 
was the culmination of longstanding common law rights against 
unreasonable searches and seizures which the King at every opportunity 
sought to destroy.69  The people of the British Empire, including the 
American colonists, were infuriated by the abridgment of their property 
rights.70  The instigating actions of British officials not only led to the 
Fourth Amendment barring unreasonable searches and seizures, but also to 
 
61. See id. at 625 (narrating James Otis’s case against writs of assistance, one of the final straws 
leading to revolution in America); Entick v. Carrington [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818; 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 
292 (declaring the secretary of state’s general warrant in the name of the King to search for libelous 
materials null and void). 
62. BRUCE A. NEWMAN, AGAINST THAT “POWERFUL ENGINE OF DESPOTISM”:  
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND GENERAL WARRANTS AT THE FOUNDING AND TODAY 2 (2007). 




65. NEWMAN, supra note 62, at 2. 
66. Id. 
67. See Entick v. Carrington [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 807–08; 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 275–76 
(describing four hours of defendants breaking locks and rifling through boxes, drawers, and chests). 
68. See Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 b (reciting the English 
principal that a man’s house is his castle and requiring the sheriff to knock on the door and announce 
a search prior to breaking and entering); NEWMAN, supra note 62, at 5–7 (discussing the common law 
customs of the English people that defied the powers of the monarchy). 
69. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 748 
(1833). 
70. NEWMAN, supra note 62, at 2–3. 
10
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the Third Amendment71 proscribing the quartering of soldiers in the 
home.72 
The Fourth Amendment encompasses a number of protections apart 
from privacy.73  For example, highway patrolmen may not unreasonably 
seize a driver’s Ford F-150.  In this example, there is no privacy violation, 
but the driver has endured an offense to his constitutional rights by the 
“seizure” of his chattel.74  The Fourth Amendment does not explicitly 
incorporate privacy,75 although Boyd certainly considered the “privacies of 
life” important to the founders.76  Privacy can be viewed as one component 
of property rights.77  Paramount among property rights is the ability of an 
owner of something to exclude others from using it or interfering with said 
use.78  Justice Black believed the right to privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment extended only insofar as property rights are 
concerned.79 
Until the late 1960s, the property rights approach governed 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.80  Under the property rights paradigm, 
the test for a Fourth Amendment search was whether the government had 
trespassed upon “persons, houses, papers or effects.”81  Modern 
proponents of this viewpoint include originalists such as the late 
 
71. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
72. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 966–67 (2d Cir. 1982) (Kauffman, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
73. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980) (explaining the 
Fourth Amendment protects a person from even a brief detention by law enforcement without cause). 
74. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (“The average 
man would very likely not have his feelings soothed any more by having his property seized openly 
than by having it seized privately and by stealth.”). 
75. Id. at 486–87 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
76. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
77. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(observing privacy rights in the eighteenth century “were understood largely in terms of property 
rights.” (quoting Morgan Cloud, Property Is Privacy: Locke and Brandeis in the Twenty-First Century, 55 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 37, 42 (2018))). 
78. See Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) (esteeming the use of property “to the 
exclusion of others” as the keystone of property rights (quoting Passailaigue v. United States, 
224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963))). 
79. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 374 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (opining the 
Fourth Amendment protects privacy only to the degree it protects property interests). 
80. See JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ & WELSH S. WHITE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 4–5 (8th ed. 2017) (describing the erosion of 
consensus regarding the proper Fourth Amendment search test after 1964). 
81. E.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2013). 
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Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas.82  This test is appealing in its direct link 
to the Fourth Amendment text: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.83 
Two immediate questions then follow under the trespass analysis:  
what is protected by the Fourth Amendment, and who may assert the  
right against unreasonable searches?  These questions precede whether a 
search is even unreasonable—a fact-intensive process that requires a 
case-by-case analysis.84  In analyzing the categories protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, “person” is hardly difficult to define as it refers to 
one’s body.85  “House,” on the other hand, presents an intermediate level 
of difficulty.  A house encompasses more than just the physical area beneath 
a roof and walls.86  Thus, it is vague as to how far this protective area 
extends under the Fourth Amendment.87 
The area just beyond the structure of the home is called the “curtilage,” 
which extends for a reasonable distance away from the home.88  It includes 
gardens around the home, the front porch, and nearby areas for parking 
vehicles.89  These areas of the home are protected from searches to the 
extent that the plain view doctrine is not already implicated.90  Subject to 
the customs of the land or other implied invitation, certain areas of the 
 
82. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91–92 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
83. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
84. GRISWOLD, supra note 57, at 13. 
85. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375–76 (2009) (holding a 
strip search, without probable cause, violates the right to be secure in one’s person against unreasonable 
searches). 
86. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (explaining a house includes the land 
immediately surrounding the home). 
87. See id. at 182 (admitting no factor or set of factors is decisive in ascertaining whether 
something is part of the curtilage). 
88. See id. at 180 (“[T]he curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated 
with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life . . . .’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))). 
89. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 3–6 (2013). 
90. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214–15 (1986) (clarifying anything in plain view is 
not protected by the Fourth Amendment even if it is done in or around the home). 
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curtilage may be welcome for law enforcement to visit, but no more than 
custom would allow, absent exigent circumstances.91  While curtilage ends 
at a reasonable distance from the home, under the traditional trespass 
doctrine, open fields were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because 
they were not considered part of the home or any of the remaining 
enumerated situses.92  These days, open fields remain unprotected for 
different reasons, namely that one simply cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a field.93 
Papers and effects are seemingly the most difficult of the enumerated 
Fourth Amendment protections to measure under the traditional trespass 
doctrine.  Effects encompass virtually all chattels,94 but how does one 
handle intangible or exchanged information in the digital era?95   
Technology alone does not present much difficulty for legal analysis under 
the original search jurisprudence, but it has presented problems for 
normative expectations of privacy.96  The third-party doctrine should not 
be taken too seriously as one may have some privacy rights in papers 
conveyed to others in certain situations.97  One can analogize email to 
papers, and the law of this country is evolving toward a consensus on this  
 
91. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8; Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011). 
92. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183–84; Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
93. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 184 (affirming the open fields doctrine as consistent with reasonable 
expectations of privacy). 
94. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700–07, 710 (1983) (concluding the detention of a 
persons baggage for ninety-minutes is an unreasonable seizure of personal effects); United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (holding automobiles are personal effects), abrogated on other grounds by 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Maureen E. Brady, Comment, The Lost “Effects” of the 
Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946, 948–51 (2016) (assuming 
from the case law that “effects” encompass all personal property).  
95. In some cases, the Court has treated some kinds of warrantless searches differently based 
on the source of information.  For example, the Court determined that warrantless searches of cell 
phones seized from an arrestee implicates greater privacy interests because the information inside a cell 
phone is quantitatively and qualitatively different than other effects.  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 
393–97 (2014).  Following Katz, it is far from clear how helpful these sui generis cases will be in the long 
run.  See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91, 97–98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing concern 
that the reasonable expectation of privacy test (REOP test) is “fuzzy,” “self-indulgent,” and not 
warranted in the text of the Constitution). 
96. See Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, Comment, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect 
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 223–27 (2018) (observing broad usage of the third-party doctrine 
prior to Carpenter to conclude that one has no expectation of privacy in information held by third 
parties). 
97. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733–37 (1877) (forbidding postal workers from opening 
and reading letters without a warrant).  
13
Stone: Saving America’s Privacy Rights
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020
  
236 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:223 
matter.98  The problem is that much of the information accompanying the 
use of chattels in the modern era creates a risk of privacy exposure and does 
not fit neatly into one’s constitutionally protected categories, such as papers 
or effects.99  Furthermore, there is still an ongoing debate as to whether one 
loses a total expectation of privacy once electronically stored information is 
passed to a bailee.100 
The debacle of chattels generating risks to privacy is the sort of trouble 
Mr. Carpenter became entangled in.  Although phone conversations are 
intangible and historically unprotected by the trespass doctrine,101 
telephone calls create metadata, which can be tracked.102  Mr. Carpenter’s 
cell phone generated multiple connections to cell towers everywhere he 
went, leading law enforcement to become knowledgeable of his 
whereabouts.103  These issues will be discussed in greater detail 
momentarily, but the next area for consideration is who may assert the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
Historically, the issue of standing placed a number of constraints on who 
could assert a Fourth Amendment claim.104  The Fourth Amendment 
codified many common law understandings, such as the English notion that 
one’s home is one’s sacred and inviolable castle that did not extend to 
 
98. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2269 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Whatever may be left of Smith 
and Miller, few doubt that e-mail should be treated much like the traditional mail it has largely 
supplanted . . . .”); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284–86 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding emails are 
like letters and subject to Fourth Amendment protection); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 
511 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing emails as conceptually indistinguishable from letters and conferring 
Fourth Amendment protection upon them). 
99. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[This case] should turn, instead, 
on whose property was searched.”) (emphasis in original). 
100. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(opining it may be time to reconsider the notion that one cannot have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information conveyed to third parties for limited purposes). 
101. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465–66 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
102. Metadata is defined as “secondary data that organize, manage, and facilitate the use and 
understanding of primary data.”  Metadata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  The very 
nature of this type of data imputes the pernicious effect of CSLI as an evidentiary tool in the modern 
age.  Cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (“While carriers have long retained CSLI for the start and end of 
incoming calls, in recent years phone companies have also collected location information from the 
transmission of text messages and routine data connections.”); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 
(1979) (discussing how the government can track telephone calls). 
103. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (noting the government catalogued 12,898 location points 
of Mr. Carpenter’s movements). 
104. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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strangers and other visitors.105  This is not to say that, under the traditional 
trespass doctrine, only the owner of a fee simple absolute could assert the 
Fourth Amendment.106  Indeed, apartment tenants, hotel guests, family 
members living at a residence, and even overnight house guests could assert 
Fourth Amendment protections.107 
The reason for broaching the subject of imputed Fourth Amendment 
protections is that modern cases involving privacy often involve contractual 
relationships.108  For example, a user of a social media platform has a 
contract called the “terms of service.”109  In exchange for advertising, the 
user is entitled to the platform’s services, and each of the parties agrees to 
follow the terms of service.110  Usually, such terms of service include limits 
on how much user data is collected.111  For example, Facebook data is 
supposed to be anonymized before it is sold to consumers.112  In theory, 
advertisers have no control over information that could specifically identify 
users.113 
In the social media example, the question arises as to what role, if any, 
contractual relations play in creating Fourth Amendment protections 
against non-trespassory government intrusions.  Katz v. United States appears 
to echo this when Justice Stewart remarked that the user of a telephone 
booth has an expectation of privacy because he has paid the toll and shut 
the door.114  If a person has a contractual relationship with a third-party 
 
105. See Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 198; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 93 a (“[T]he house of 
any one is not a castle or privilege but for himself . . . .”). 
106.  Carter, 525 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 
616–18 (1961) (holding unlawful the forced entry of landlord—with assistance of law enforcement—
into lessee’s premises). 
107. Carter, 525 U.S. at 90, 95–97 (Scalia, J., concurring).  But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
141–42 (1978) (implying not all guests may able to assert Fourth Amendment protection). 
108. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
109. Facebook Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (2018), https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms 
[https://perma.cc/J4RN-3VE7]. 
110. Id. 
111. See Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Jan. 22, 2019), https://policies.google.com/privacy#info 
choices [https://perma.cc/R8FW-4T6L] (allowing users to limit the information Google collects). 
112. See Facebook Data Policy, FACEBOOK (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/ 
policy.php [https://perma.cc/E6FV-DKLP] (promising users their personal information such as 
name and email address will not be given to advertisers). 
113. See id. (stating Facebook does not give out personally identifiable information unless given 
permission). 
114. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967) (“One who . . . pays the toll that 
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters . . . will not be broadcast 
to the world.”). 
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involving the exchange of data, it is debatable if the customer should be 
permitted to contest a subpoena on the basis of property or quasi-property 
law.115 
Electronic information in a database can be challenging to reconcile with 
the tangible concepts of property to which the Amendment explicitly refers.  
However, there are a number of approaches for extending privacy law to 
encompass the public’s electronic footprint.  Although there are many 
arguments for tweaking existing jurisprudence to modernize privacy rights 
at the national level, the top-down approach is not the only possibility.  
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Carpenter alludes to the possibility that states will 
create new property rights in intangible things produced by technology.116  
The modern genesis of digital property rights in intangibles, such as email 
accounts and website domains, suggests that state statutes and the common 
law have already commenced transforming privacy law in the United 
States.117 
The advancement of technology has created a sticky situation for the 
Court.  On the one hand, it is tempting to extend the Fourth Amendment 
to protect one’s privacy from the dangers of modern technology because so 
many technologies are indispensable to daily living.118  On the other hand, 
extending the Fourth Amendment beyond the enumerated protections 
places strain on the text.119 
The traditional search test clashed with emerging technology in the early 
twentieth century when telephones first came into widespread usage.120  
Many jurists recognized that law enforcement does not have to search an 
 
115. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2270–72 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(sympathizing with the notion of states creating new property rights to solve the privacy dilemma). 
116. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2270–72 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
117. See id. at 2270 (“If state legislators or state courts say that a digital record has the attributes 
that normally make something property, that may supply a sounder basis for judicial decisionmaking 
than judicial guesswork about societal expectations.”). 
118. Freiwald & Smith, supra note 96, at 225–26. 
119. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting the 
temptation to change the Constitution to keep in step with the times). 
120. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (“The United States takes no such 
care of telegraph or telephone messages as of mailed sealed letters.  The Amendment does not forbid 
what was done here.  There was no searching.  There was no seizure.  The evidence was secured by 
the use of the sense of hearing and that only.  There was no entry of the houses of offices of the 
defendants.”), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41 (1967). 
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area physically to invade the privacy of others.121  Police started to tap 
telephone lines to listen in on conversations.122  This proved to be a 
beneficial tool in mitigating crime.  However, it came at the expense of one’s 
normative expectations of privacy, a concept that Justice Brandeis 
expounded upon around the turn of the century.123  When the police 
tapped into telephone lines, there was no technical trespass, and in 
Olmstead v. United States,124 the Court held there was no violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, despite the adamant protestations of 
Justice Brandeis.125 
Justice Brandeis’s dissent built upon his earlier writings advocating for the 
recognition of new rights as technology and society changed.126  He 
believed jurists should not be restrained from modifying or adding to the 
law as needed for the common good.127  “Legal realism,”128 or 
“purposivism,”129 a view focused on the spirit of constitutional texts, did 
not gain wide acceptance until the mid-twentieth century.130  To understand 
the zeitgeist of the legal world at that time, scholars should note 
the relative slowness of incorporating the Bill of Rights under the 
 
121. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“There 
was no physical entry in this case.  But the search of one’s home or office no longer requires physical 
entry, for science has brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a person’s privacy 
than the direct and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forebears and which 
inspired the Fourth Amendment.”); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Subtler and 
more far reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government.  Discovery 
and invention have made it possible for the government, by means far more effective than stretching 
upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.”). 
122. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456–57. 
123. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193–95 
(1890) (depicting the evolution of causes of action when the sanctity of one’s person was encroached, 
either through battery, nuisance, trespass, or invasion of property rights). 
124. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456–57. 
125. Id. at 473–78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
126. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 123, at 194 (declaring support for creating or extending 
existing rights as society changes). 
127. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 476–77 (rejecting a literal construction of the Constitution when 
it would allegedly defeat its object). 
128. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 271 (2002) 
(narrating a change in American legal philosophy heralded by legal theorist Karl Llewellyn who praised 
a flexible “style of reason” that considered public policy and principles). 
129. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 18–19 (2012) (writing that purposivists interpreting a legal provision use the text as a 
starting point and adjust the level of generality to reach socially acceptable outcomes). 
130. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
“rhapsodical strains” of the majority to make the Constitution measure up to the times). 
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Fourteenth Amendment and reluctance towards appearing to endorse 
substantive due process.131  The 1960s saw the rapid takeoff in civil rights 
jurisprudence after the exclusionary rule was applied to the states in 
Mapp v. Ohio.132  The Fourth Amendment followed this trend.  The 
Supreme Court was no longer impressed with strict adherence to the literal 
letter of the law found in Olmstead.133  In the year that followed, 
Silverman v. United States134 was the last case to make significant use of the 
trespass test for Fourth Amendment searches.135 
Silverman exemplified the rapid change of technology in the Cold War Era 
of spies and space flight when law enforcement used a “spike mike” to listen 
in on the activities of next-door neighbors living in an adjoining 
apartment.136  The next-door neighbors permitted law enforcement to 
come into their living space and insert a spike mike into the wall.137  In 
ruling for Silverman, the Court held that because the spike mike intruded 
into the section of the house owned by Silverman, law enforcement 
conducted a warrantless search.138  The Court distinguished this case from 
earlier eavesdropping cases, but this opinion arguably sliced the trespass 
doctrine bread very thin.  While proscribing law enforcement from intruding 
on private property even an inch, as long as such activity could be deemed 
a physical trespass, purely electronic intrusions could continue.  A few years 
later, Katz v. United States overruled the previous holding in Olmstead—that 
phone tapping did not implicate the Fourth Amendment due to the absence 
of physical trespass.139 
 
131. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (acknowledging the 
Second Amendment applies to the states); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 524–31 (5th ed. 2015) (recounting the arguments of various legal scholars 
regarding the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
132. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 
(1966) (holding individuals are entitled to be informed of their right to remain silent and obtain counsel 
when taken into police custody and questioned); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) 
(requiring the provision of counsel to needy defendants). 
133. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967) (departing from the “narrow” 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Olmstead). 
134. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
135. Gerald S. Reamey, Constitutional Shapeshifting: Giving the Fourth Amendment Substance in the 
Technology Driven World of Criminal Investigation, 14 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 201, 215–16 
(2018). 
136. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 506. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 509–10. 
139. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967). 
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In Katz, the Court essentially held that the appellant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy that government agents would not intercept his 
conversation.140  In the majority opinion, Justice Stewart threw a wrench 
into the gears of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; he stipulated that the 
Court’s decision was based on the fact that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, rather than places.”141  Commentators have criticized him 
for not adequately explaining what protections people are entitled to, as it is 
obvious that the Fourth Amendment protects people.142  Some jurists have 
described the Katz test as conclusory and self-indulgent.143  By crafting a 
two-step test for whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion comes the closest to describing what it 
means to have justifiable reliance that one’s privacy will not be invaded.144 
The Court soon adopted Justice Harlan’s REOP test, eschewing the 
traditional trespass test.145  Justice Harlan’s REOP test has two 
components.  Whether the Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s 
privacy depends on (1) one’s subjective expectation of privacy and 
(2) whether the individual’s expectation of privacy is one which society is 
prepared to accept from an objective standpoint.146  The first part of the 
test is often dispensed with, leading some to remark that the REOP test has 
only one prong.147 
Because it is often apparent or assumed that one subjectively believes his 
privacy is protected, courts often jump to the objective analysis.148  To be 
of any significance, the subjective expectation must be objectively 
 
140. Cf. id. at 353 (holding government wire tapping violated Katz’s privacy on which Katz 
justifiably relied).  Although Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, which created the REOP test, was 
not used by the majority in Katz, this would change within the decade.  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
154 (1978). 
141. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
142. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 71–72 (6th ed. 2013). 
143. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
144. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining the reasonable expectation 
of privacy as “a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, 
activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no 
intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”). 
145. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971). 
146. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
147. See Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 113, 114 (2015) (arguing Katz is “only a one-step test[,]” and “[s]ubjective expectations are 
irrelevant.”). 
148. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 142, at 79. 
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reasonable.149  Taken literally, any declaration by the government of 
pervasive surveillance could eliminate one’s subjective expectation of 
privacy.150 
In recent years, Justice Harlan’s test has, in practice, become largely a 
one-step objective analysis.151  As for the objective expectation of privacy, 
the Supreme Court has oscillated between a couple of interpretations.152  
An expectation of privacy that “society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable”153 appears to refer to a normative expectation of privacy.154  
Justice Harlan’s post Katz views support this interpretation of the objective 
prong.155  However, the Court more often assesses whether one’s 
expectation of privacy is empirically reasonable.156 
An empirical view of Justice Harlan’s REOP test is supported by 
numerous examples, including Justice Stewart’s majority opinion in Katz.157  
Justice Stewart described a Fourth Amendment that supplies privacy 
protection from some forms of government intrusion, but not all.158  He 
explained that, although each search case is a world of its own without a 
one-size-fits-all test, a person’s voluntary exposure or disclosure of facts to 
the world renders the Fourth Amendment inapplicable insofar as the 
conveyed information is concerned.159  The empirical test creates 
considerable tension with its key goal: flexibility in extending privacy 
rights.160  Because an empirical analysis of likelihood is far removed from 
 
149. See id. at 76 (recognizing “an expectation of privacy is ‘reasonable’ when a ‘reasonable 
person’ would not expect his privacy [to be] at serious risk”). 
150. Id. at 74. 
151. Kerr, supra note 147, at 114. 
152. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 142, at 77 (explaining how the Court uses both the 
normative and empirical approaches). 
153. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
154. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 142, at 77. 
155. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (supporting the 
notion that judges should weigh the “desirability of saddling” the public with privacy risks). 
156. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 142, at 77 (writing courts often view the fact that 
a privacy incursion happened as empirical evidence that the expectation of privacy was unreasonable). 
157. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
158. Id. at 350. 
159. Id. at 351. 
160. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43–44 (1988) (refusing to hold search of 
discarded household garbage unreasonable even though the state common law created a privacy 
interest in garbage). 
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value judgments, yesterday’s reasonable expectation of privacy can be 
overridden by technology.161 
Some technologies allow one to scan information about the interior of 
the home from the outside of the home.  In Kyllo v. United States,162 the 
Supreme Court held that one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
activities within the home when technology not in general public use is 
employed to scan the home.163  This holding provides a narrow exception 
to the general rule that information sent to the outside world is outside the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment.  The Court in Kyllo declined to clarify both 
its meaning of common use and what would happen when technology 
crossed that bridge. 
The empirical view of privacy led to results seemingly at odds with the 
goals behind Katz, namely an expansive third-party doctrine.164  The Court 
has held that one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
litany of circumstances that diminish the value of one’s privacy, including 
financial transactions, telephone metadata, garbage left for pickup, and 
concealed activity in a greenhouse visible by a low-flying police 
helicopter.165  This is the case even though one passes on information to 
third-parties with the expectation that it will be used for limited 
purposes.166  Much remains unclear regarding reasonable expectations of 
privacy. 
D. Where Fourth Amendment Search Doctrine Stands Today 
Ultimately, the outcome under the REOP test is ethereal and mysterious.  
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have cynically remarked that the 
expectations of privacy that society is willing to recognize “bear an uncanny 
resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers 
 
161. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (holding observations from a helicopter 
hovering 400 feet above a house did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy). 
162. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
163. Id. at 34–35.  Many scholars have criticized this decision because even when this case was 
decided, heat scanning technology was in common use.  One popular application of this technology is 
in heat sensing night vision goggles for hunters, which has been used for many years. 
164. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (calling attention to the fact 
that deposit slips and other information that are seen by bank employees, and concluding bank records 
are not covered by the Fourth Amendment). 
165. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2266 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
166. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (suggesting 
a review of the current doctrine that a reasonable expectation of privacy does not extend to information 
voluntarily conveyed to third-parties). 
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reasonable.”167  The REOP test, one so flexible in nature, is the victim of 
its own malleability; simultaneously, the test’s greatest strength is its own 
worst enemy.168  Social data is not used in formulating reasonable 
expectations of privacy; therefore, the judge is left to his own sense of public 
policy, an “unruly horse”169 that draws criticism that the Court is 
implementing an ad hoc doctrine reflecting its own views.170 
From these facts, it stands to reason that, in recent years, the Court has 
distanced itself from the REOP test.  In the early 2010s, the old trespassory 
test reappeared,171 so that the Court’s search jurisprudence was “said to 
have two heads.’”172  With Carpenter, the Court’s jurisprudence is, arguably, 
now a three-headed hydra with CSLI as a distinct exception to the third-
party doctrine.  The Supreme Court had the opportunity to dispose of the 
case under the two tests above and the law governing subpoenas.173  
Instead, the Court took on a new course. 
American privacy jurisprudence is at a crossroads.  Carpenter is one in a 
series of inconsistent cases dating back to Katz.  The Katz cases had issues 
of their own, but Carpenter is one mutation too many.  Conversely, the need 
for meaningful privacy reform is greater than ever in a world of widespread 
data exchange.  Challenges to privacy come from every direction, and the 
government is just one particular threat.  Nevertheless, resolving the issue 
of government intrusion matters most, as one must jealously guard civil 
liberties from the state with every generation.  A solution to the confusion 
surrounding privacy policy should be uniform and statutory.  Other 
countries are ahead of the United States in this regard.174  The courts can 
only resolve matters long after they have come to light.  A more permanent 
legislative remedy is required. 
 
167. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
168. Reamey, supra note 135, at 232. 
169. Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing. 229, 252. 
170. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 142, at 77–78 n.63 (observing the Supreme Court 
has made no serious attempt to use sociological studies in its decisions, and noting that one study 
shows the Court is often out-of-step with public perceptions). 
171. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 409 (clarifying that the REOP test is a supplement to the traditional 
trespass analysis). 
172. Reamey, supra note 135, at 223. 
173. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
174. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules 
in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2000) (recognizing United States 
privacy laws are inferior to the countries which make up the European Union). 
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III.    WHY THE SUPREME COURT IN CARPENTER REACHED A LEGALLY 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION 
A. A Summary of Errors in Carpenter 
The majority in Carpenter v. United States makes a number of mistakes in 
its analysis that disserve the goals of a coherent Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence,175 the interests of law enforcement,176 and ultimately, 
privacy itself.177  A point that seems to be overlooked is that Carpenter calls 
into question whether other subpoenas for information from third parties 
are to be treated as searches.178  Liberty is a defining principle in Western 
culture, which values individualism.179  However, the Court’s primary role 
is interpretation; decisions that cross the line into the Legislature’s arena risk 
constitutional imbalance.180 
The system of laws in the United States is largely statutory and, generally 
speaking, there is no expansive body of federal common law.181  Yet, 
accessibility to evidence acquired through subpoenas remains critically 
important to law enforcement and courts of law.182  To ensure 
constitutional protections, a more expansive development of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence could have provided law enforcement 
with a narrower means to establish probable cause to arrest 
 
175. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2257 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court has created an independent line of case law that allows one to object to a subpoena of 
third-party’s business records—a holding contrary to both the property-based Fourth Amendment test 
and the REOP test). 
176. See id. at 2247 (criticizing an approach likely to limit the investigative powers of law 
enforcement and grand juries to issue a subpoena duces tecum without showing of probable cause). 
177. Id. at 2261. 
178. Id. at 2260–61 (considering the possibility that the majority’s holding may generally require 
subpoenas for documents to be based on probable cause and the Court may have to add many 
interpretive nuances to clarify the majority’s decision in the future). 
179. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (expounding on the 
role of an individual’s autonomous conceptualization of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
180. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 339–40 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (implying the courts 
will only command national respect when they exercise self-restraint and discipline so as to not attempt 
to right every possible wrong). 
181. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general 
common law.  Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State 
whether they be local in nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.  And 
no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”). 
182. See supra text and notes accompanying Part I. 
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Mr. Carpenter.183  However, the permissible scope of probable cause is an 
arena where the Legislature—not the courts—should weigh the interests of 
security and personal privacy.184  Courts should not intervene against 
policies thought to be unwise unless there is an actual legal problem.185 
Undoubtedly, many readers will hear the originalist echo that legislatures 
should resolve the day-to-day challenges facing the United States.186  It is 
up to the reader whether a legislative system, which has become polarized 
in recent years, should continue to be the focal point of lawmaking.187  If 
the reader does believe in the republic, it stands to reason that courts should 
not spoon-feed the Legislature and create a condition of learned 
helplessness each time a major controversy arises. 
The Supreme Court has indeed extended a helping hand to the most 
vulnerable in our society when it required states to furnish counsel to needy 
defendants188 and commanded law enforcement to notify certain arrestees 
of their right to remain silent.189  These have been positive developments 
in the law, but to merely focus on these effects is to miss the point: 
Legislatures should step up to their responsibilities as lawmakers to resolve 
 
183. Indeed, law enforcement could have asked first for one week of CSLI data before asking 
for months of CSLI.  Cf. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“By limiting the authorization 
to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement 
ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character 
of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.”). 
184. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2265 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(“Answering questions like [how much privacy protection a society should have] calls for the exercise 
of raw political will belonging to legislatures, not the legal judgment proper to courts.”). 
185. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–99 (1937) (holding the Court 
should defer to the Legislature’s wisdom regarding policy). 
186. See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 
756–57 (2017) (discussing Justice Scalia’s textualist approach to statutory interpretation as devoid of 
“elevat[ing] a statute’s purpose over its enacted text”).  See generally 2016 National Lawyers Convention, 
Justice Scalia on Federalism and Separation of Powers, 30 REGENT UNIV. L. REV. 57 (2017) (chronicalling 
Justice Scalia’s illustrious history of citing, lecturing, and defending the separation of powers). 
187. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Fixing Congress, 33 BYU J. PUB. L. 227, 236 (2019) 
(“[P]olarization in the House (and Senate) is less the product of systematic manipulation than it is a 
reflection of the wider polarization and stridency among Americans that characterizes our modern 
politics, and the rise of divisive (or ‘wedge’) issues that have increasingly fractured our politics.”) 
(citations omitted). 
188. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (advocating representation for 
indigent defendants to safeguard fairness in criminal proceedings). 
189. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966) (“At the outset, if a person in custody 
is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he 
has the right to remain silent.”). 
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important societal questions.190  If the American Republic is up to the task, 
then let it cast aside its judicial crutches.  If it is incapable of protecting the 
freedoms for which it was founded, let a new system take its place; a system 
of judicial colonialism is incompatible with responsible people capable of 
self-rule. 
The reader should bear in mind that the privacy jurisprudence before 
Carpenter was already a confusing patchwork.191  As discussed earlier, the 
Court’s privacy doctrine uses both the trespass test and the REOP test.192  
Chief Justice Roberts, who joined the majority opinion in 
United States v. Jones,193 understood the value of deciding search and seizure 
cases on narrow grounds.194  That is why the trespass doctrine 
resurfaced.195  The REOP test shows little signs of becoming more 
objective and less a private value judgment of an unelected judiciary.196  
Because the REOP test proved to be a hard public policy pill for the Court 
to swallow, the Supreme Court cultivated the third-party doctrine to 
mitigate its open-ended foray into the unknown.197  The third-party 
doctrine championed by crime-weary jurists alleviated much of the concern 
that law enforcement would be unable to carry out its duties as 
effectively.198  
 
190. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”); 
cf. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 12 (2003) (“[T]his Court has a longstanding tradition of deferring 
to state legislatures in making and implementing such important policy decisions.”). 
191. See Reamey, supra note 135, at 204 (describing the transition from the property-based 
doctrine of trespass to a case-by-case adjudication approach). 
192. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (“[A]s we have discussed, the Katz 
[REOP] test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”). 
193. Id. at 401. 
194. See id. at 411–12 (electing to use the trespass analysis when electronic monitoring involved 
a trespass and delaying answering the question of whether purely electronic monitoring over a long 
time period would violate the Fourth Amendment). 
195. Cf. id. at 411 (“What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, 
which we believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted.”). 
196. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2265–67 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing Katz for not clearly articulating whether the test is normative or empirical, and explaining 
that if it is normative, the results of Katz have been inconsistent, and in some cases, unbelievable given 
actual social norms). 
197. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 581–85 (2009) 
(discussing how the third-party doctrine clarifies Katz jurisprudence and law enforcement). 
198. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 142, at 78 (explaining many post-Katz decisions 
reflected the same treatment they would have received under the trespass test). 
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Even assuming one has some expectation of privacy in the information 
conveyed to others, it is unclear what guidance should be used to draw the 
line.  Intuitively, it would seem absurd to give one an expectation of privacy 
in the information conveyed to an undercover agent,199 on the other hand, 
however, society benefits from the trust one places in a friend.  
Furthermore, courts would have a hard time measuring the expectation of 
privacy one would have in information read off a computer screen in a 
coffee shop.200 
Logically, both Justice Harlan’s REOP test and the third-party REOP test 
should have led the Court to affirm the judgment of the Sixth Circuit that 
the subpoena of Mr. Carpenter’s CSLI was not a Fourth Amendment 
search.201  This is mathematically certain when one follows third-party 
doctrine precedent.  When one excludes third-party doctrine from the 
equation, the results become wildly unpredictable.  
Justice Harlan’s REOP test would have yielded a judgment for the 
government because no statute or other legal principal gave Mr. Carpenter 
a property interest in the CSLI.202  Alternatively, under a more complicated 
analysis, Mr. Carpenter had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his CSLI because that information was voluntarily conveyed to the cell 
company.203  Because the empirical view of privacy has traditionally 
overwritten normative considerations, stare decisis should have made 
Carpenter an easy case under the REOP test’s standard.204  Information 
sharing is necessary in the modern world; there is no doubt that this presents 
problems for one’s normative expectation of privacy, but this is a question 
of policy rather than law. 
 
199. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966) (denying Fourth Amendment 
protection in conversations to undercover government agents). 
200. There is ample evidence that reading off another’s computer or cell phone screen violates 
social norms of privacy.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (emphasizing the 
importance of privacy with cell phones due to the sensitive data typically stored on them); 
WASHINGTON’S RULES OF CIVILITY & DECENT BEHAVIOR IN COMPANY AND CONVERSATION 15 
(J.M. Toner ed., 1888) (“[C]ome not near the Books or Writings of Another so as to read them . . . also 
look not nigh when another is writing a Letter.”). 
201. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
202. See id. at 2257–59 (doubting Mr. Carpenter had a property interest in CSLI because he has 
no right to possession without paying the cell company a fee). 
203. Id. at 2230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
204. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 142, at 79–80 (implying that the fact that an illegal 
activity is witnessed is often used as a means to negate an assertion of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
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The Court premised its decision that law enforcement could not obtain 
more than six days of CSLI without a search warrant on the novelty of the 
information sought.205  The Court did not explain why six days of CSLI 
could be obtained without a warrant and not seven.  One may only speculate 
on how this bright line was delineated.  The Court wrote that although one 
would not ordinarily possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
movements knowingly exposed to others, new technology has made it 
possible to chronicle the near entirety of one’s movements.206  In the past, 
it was more costly and difficult to maintain constant surveillance of 
citizens.207  In so doing, the Court sought to alleviate the near century-old 
concern of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead—that law enforcement may invade 
privacy using new technology if left unchecked by the judiciary.208  
Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts applauded the foresight of 
Justice Brandeis in 1928, while chiding Justice Kennedy and the dissenters 
for failing to contemplate the “seismic shifts” in technology.209  Legal 
doctrine requires that in ascertaining whether a Fourth Amendment 
violation has occurred, the jurist must first determine whether a search has 
occurred.210  If a court decides that a search has occurred, the next question 
is whether the search was unreasonable.211 
In summary, the Supreme Court erred in holding that Mr. Carpenter’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated because law enforcement did not 
conduct a “search,” as that word is understood in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.212  This is true for three reasons: courts do not treat 
 
205. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (majority opinion) (refusing to apply the third-party 
doctrine “given the unique nature of cell phone location information.”).  
206. See id. at 2218 (observing that through CSLI, the government may undertake “near perfect 
surveillance.”). 
207. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that in 
the pre-digital age, police would not and could not monitor every movement of an individual). 
208. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
209. Id. at 2223.  It is curious that Chief Justice Roberts dismisses Justice Kennedy’s views out 
of hand as if he were out of touch with the realities of societal change.  Justice Kennedy has provided 
progressive legal activists his swing vote in a number of cases concerning contentious social issues.  
See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN L. REV. 151, 156 (2016) (calling 
Justice Kennedy “the principal architect of the sexual orientation cases and the swing vote in most 
equality cases.”).  The criticism that he is out of step with the times on privacy rights seems unfair given 
that Justice Kennedy has never been an archconservative. 
210. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2226 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
211. Cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964) (mandating in cases of a warrantless 
search, the Court must examine whether a search was reasonable). 
212. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2226 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (summarizing holdings of five 
cases interpreting the meaning of search in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
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subpoenas for third-party business records as searches,213 Mr. Carpenter’s 
property was not affected,214 and he did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information voluntarily exposed to a third-party.215  The SCA 
requires that law enforcement seek a subpoena for electronically stored 
customer information from a court of competent jurisdiction.216  The 
subpoena can only be issued on the showing of specific and articulable facts 
demonstrating reasonable grounds to believe the information is germane to 
a criminal investigation.217 
B. The Majority in Carpenter Erred in Applying a Heightened Standard for a 
Subpoena of More Than Six Days of CSLI Records, Disrupting the 
Longstanding Subpoena Analysis 
The Court in Carpenter imposed an unexpected restriction on the ability 
to subpoena third-party business records when it concluded a subpoena for 
CSLI data constituted a search.218  It did so without further explanation 
and then made a logical leap to the reasonableness inquiry.219  The Supreme 
Court has traditionally classified the use of a subpoena as a “constructive 
search.”220  Subpoenas are not as intrusive as actual searches in which a law 
enforcement officer enters a property and proceeds to inspect the property 
of another.221  Accordingly, a subpoena duces tecum is held to a lower 
standard than probable cause.222  A subpoena will be deemed unreasonable 
 
213. See id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing how the majority ignores the difference 
between searches and court orders requesting production of evidence). 
214. See id. at 2242–43 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing Mr. Carpenter failed to show he had 
any property interest in CSLI data). 
215. Id. at 2223–24 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
216. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012), declared unconstitutional in part by Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 
(“[T]he Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring 
[CSLI].”). 
217. Id. 
218. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (majority opinion). 
219. Cf. id. at 2235 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s holding that an 
unreasonable search occurred without first remanding the case to determine if the search was 
unreasonable). 
220. See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 201–04 (1946) (detailing the 
confusion between actual searches and constructive searches). 
221. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2228 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that a warrant “allows the 
Government to enter and seize and make examination itself” whereas a subpoena “requires the person 
to whom it is directed to make the disclosure”); cf. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) 
(identifying the primary force behind the Fourth Amendment as the practice of British soldiers 
“rummag[ing]” through homes by means of general warrants). 
222. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 327 U.S. at 208. 
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under the Fourth Amendment if the government abuses its power with an 
indefinite request for production.223 
When an individual receives a subpoena, the respondent collects the 
necessary documents or things to be produced.224  There is no invasion of 
privacy apart from the production of the items demanded in the 
subpoena,225 and because the individual has an opportunity to object to the 
subpoena as unduly burdensome, there is some recourse.226  In a search, 
the law enforcement officer is entitled to use reasonable force to fulfill his 
investigatory role,227 and the one being searched only has a cause of action 
after the fact if the search was unreasonable.228 
Although an individual whose cell site location information is sought will 
not be pleased by law enforcement knowing their whereabouts, CSLI is the 
property of the cell company under existing law.  The Fourth Amendment 
protects citizens in “their persons, houses, papers, and effects”229; any 
privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are necessarily linked to 
property rights, even if the REOP test does not require technical 
trespass.230  Because a cell company creates the records of CSLI in the 
course of connecting a customer’s phone to the network as well as in billing 
for roaming charges, this constitutes a cell company’s proprietary 
information.231 
 
223. See id. (“[T]he Fourth [Amendment] . . . guards against abuse only by way of too much 
indefiniteness . . . .  The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the 
disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.”). 
224. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2228 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
225. See id. (explaining that the option to object to the subpoena “mitigates the intrusion”). 
226. Id. 
227. See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71–72 (1998) (concluding police officers acted 
reasonably by breaking windows during a search to prevent occupants from grabbing firearms in the 
garage); Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep’t, 844 F.3d 556, 572 (6th Cir. 2016) (concluding police 
officers acted reasonably in shooting two dogs during a search); cf. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 
464 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (explaining how searches involve unconsented entry into areas forbidden to 
the general public). 
228. Cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 327 U.S. at 195 (implying a subpoena gives the recipient the 
opportunity to contest a request when he suffers injury unlike an actual search). 
229. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
230. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2227–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (claiming that privacy rights are 
necessarily rooted to “commonsense principle that the absence of property law analogues can be 
dispositive of privacy expectations”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (“[I]f police officers 
had not been guilty of a common law trespass they were not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment 
from eavesdropping . . . .”). 
231. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2229–30 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Once the CSLI information is anonymized, the cell company will often 
sell this information.232  Even assuming that the subpoena constituted a 
search, Mr. Carpenter should not have been entitled to raise an objection 
because he could not have raised a cause of action for which the law could 
offer relief.233  Admittedly, one intuitively believes CSLI is generally kept 
private from the general public, and this implicit understanding is reflected 
in the fact that cellular providers anonymize user data prior to selling it.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the law has not caught up with society is not 
sufficient cause for the court system to intervene.  Absent a statutory or 
constitutional change, subpoenas are proper for acquiring evidence, whether 
or not the proponent has demonstrated probable cause.234 
Subpoenas have been used in the common law for many years.235  
History reveals the propriety of court orders for production pursuant to an 
investigation.236  The Framers of the Constitution were aware of the 
subpoena duces tecum during the drafting of the Fourth Amendment.237  If 
the Framers had intended to attach a standard of probable cause to 
subpoenas, they most likely would have included that provision.  The 
founders were indeed concerned about the “privacies of life,”238 but the 
overarching concern was the destruction and abuse of property rights.239  
It is hornbook law that the power to exclude is the foremost aspect of 
property.240  Requiring a search warrant for the most intrusive means of 
 
232. Id. at 2212 (majority opinion). 
233. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (permitting a motion to dismiss for failing to state a claim on 
which relief may be granted); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979) (refusing to accept that 
one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed and thus voluntarily provided 
to the telephone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (declining to extend 
the Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy of bank client’s financial records). 
234. Cf. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 73, 76 (1906) (generally exempting subpoenas from the 
intense scrutiny of the Fourth Amendment apart from a reasonableness analysis on the grounds that 
justice would otherwise be impeded). 
235. E.g., Rex v. Dixon [1765] 97 Eng. Rep. 1047; 3 Burr. 1685. 
236. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280 (1919) (recognizing the inquisitorial power of 
grand juries to compel production of evidence and the testimony of witnesses). 
237. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2249–50 (Alito, J., dissenting) (concluding the founders 
supported the concept of the grand jury because they were aware of its powers, including the subpoena 
of evidence). 
238. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
239. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2240 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (declaring property the “organizing 
constitutional idea of the founding era”). 
240. See Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) (“Property is composed of constituent 
elements and of these elements the right to use the physical thing to the exclusion of others is the  
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acquiring evidence struck a balance between property rights and the 
execution of the law. 
Property rights, like all other rights, are not unlimited.241  
The Supreme Court has expounded “the ancient proposition of law” that 
“the public has a right to every man’s evidence.”242  Law enforcement often 
requires the power to issue a subpoena to build enough evidence to establish 
probable cause to arrest dangerous criminals, including murderers and 
rapists.243  In the case of Mr. Carpenter, a man who conducted a series of 
six robberies across multiple states,244 CSLI data was well-suited to building 
circumstantial evidence implicating him in the robberies.245  Additional data 
regarding his whereabouts over a longer time period would also establish 
whether he typically visited these areas.246  If Mr. Carpenter had regularly 
visited these areas in the past, such evidence might prove exculpatory.247 
A subpoena duces tecum is not only useful to law enforcement, but to grand 
juries as well.248  Their impact would be significantly reduced if law 
enforcement required probable cause every time they sought to produce 
information.249  The only case to hold that probable cause is required for a 
subpoena was Boyd, and courts quickly retreated from that view.250  In 
Carpenter, the Court appeared to resurrect this view.251  Clear precedent in 
Smith v. Maryland 252 and United States v. Miller 253 dictates otherwise.254 
 
most essential and beneficial.” (quoting Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 
(M.D. Ga. 1963))). 
241. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding the 
Second Amendment, like most rights, is not unlimited); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 
(2008) (restating that freedom of speech does not protect obscenity). 
242. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). 
243. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2233–34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
244. Id. at 2212 (majority opinion). 
245. Id. at 2226 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
246. Id. 
247. Cf. id. (observing that if Mr. Carpenter had visited any less regularly, it became more likely 
that he had participated in the robbery). 
248. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). 
249. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting) (listing the adverse consequences to 
investigations of terrorism, political corruption, and white-collar crimes if subpoenas required probable 
cause). 
250. Id. at 2253. 
251. Id. at 2255. 
252. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
253. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
254. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2228 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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In Smith and Miller, telephone call metadata and bank records were sought 
via subpoena, and the Supreme Court held there was no search in either 
case.255  The Court in Carpenter distinguished these analogous cases by 
suggesting that CSLI on a person’s whereabouts is a different category of 
data altogether.256  However, information relating to who a person calls, 
and where and to whom a person exchanges money, is arguably more 
intrusive to privacy.257  Such information can reveal associations, as well as 
a person’s private beliefs and interests.258 
C. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Carpenter Cannot Be Justified Under 
Fourth Amendment Trespass Doctrine Because Mr. Carpenter Had No Property 
Interest in His CSLI 
Another hurdle for Mr. Carpenter was that he could not prove that he 
had a property interest in his CSLI.259  In fairness, it is sensitive 
information, but as a matter of law, he nevertheless lacks any kind of 
property interest.260  Mr. Carpenter argued that he had a right to his CSLI 
under the SCA.261  While Mr. Carpenter may request to see his CSLI data, 
he is not entitled to possession.262  The cell company is entitled to payment 
to produce the information.263  This is inconsistent with customer data 
ownership if the customer must pay to take possession of his alleged 
property.264 
Because Mr. Carpenter did not have any quantum of data ownership, he 
was not entitled to contest the subpoena, nor was he able to succeed under 
the trespass theory.265  However, under a trespass analysis, one must 
consider more than the fact that the SCA is inconsistent with the ownership 
of CSLI data.  In particular, one must look at whether CSLI could be 
 
255. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44; Miller, 425 U.S. at 444. 
256. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
257. See id. (illustrating the vast amount of information the Government gathers through the 
use of cell-site records). 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 2257–59 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 2257. 
263. Id. at 2258. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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considered one’s “papers” or “effects.”266  The trespass doctrine, after all, 
encompasses an enumerated set of protected things.267 
It is difficult to argue that CSLI is one of Mr. Carpenter’s papers.  Even 
though one can see analogues to papers in many digital aspects of life, just 
as one can see analogues to free speech in physical acts268 and t-shirt 
messages,269 there is nothing comparable to papers in CSLI.  Papers appear 
to refer to compositions of words or other creative means of expression.  
This meaning is reinforced by Dr. Samuel Johnson’s dictionary, which 
defines paper as the “substance on which men write and print.”270  CSLI 
itself cannot be reconciled with the eighteenth-century definition of papers, 
as it is not a medium for composing thoughts like physical paper.   
A unit of CSLI is a relative geographic measuring stick indicating one was 
within a physical area.271  CSLI is most likely an effect under the 
Fourth Amendment, as effects capture nearly all chattels.272  At first glance, 
it appears to be a stretch to include bits of data, given that the contents 
themselves are intangible.  However, courts should not be rigid about 
extending the idea of property, even if it is in electronic form. 
If Mr. Carpenter had some creative input in the making of CSLI, he might 
have had a claim that it was one of his papers.273  What is not clear is: what 
property interest, if any, a person has in their own physical movements.  The 
Supreme Court has previously stated that one does not have an expectation 
of privacy in movements made and conveyed in public to anyone 
watching,274 but this alone does not answer whether a person has a property 
interest in the totality of one’s physical movements.  Perhaps the principles 
 
266. See id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (expressing belief CSLI might be papers and effects 
but determining issue was not adequately developed in lower court). 
267. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects . . . .”). 
268. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding flag burning is considered an 
exercise of free speech). 
269. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (explaining how wearing a t-shirt is 
considered exercising free speech). 
270. Paper, 2 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1967). 
271. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
272. Brady, supra note 94, at 948–51 (assuming from the relevant case law that “effects” 
encompass all personal property).  
273. See Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1020 (1984) (recognizing a property right 
in trade secrets); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 64 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 2014) 
(explaining how ideas can become property if used to compose an imaginative work). 
274. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (holding an individual had “no 
reasonable expectation of privacy” while driving his automobile in public). 
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of the common law support a right to at least some ownership.  Property is, 
after all, a bundle of rights.  One may have a differing quantum of property 
ownership such as a fee simple absolute, a life estate, or a term of years, and 
the government is bound to respect those property rights.275 
The closest analogues the author has found to a property claim in one’s 
physical movements are claims for damages based on property ownership 
in one’s likeness or personality,276 one’s biological cells,277 and one’s 
ideas.278  From a theoretical standpoint, it would appear that a claim of 
interest in one’s movements falls on a tangibility spectrum ranging from 
one’s ideas on one end to one’s cells on the other.  Mere ideas are not 
considered property,279 although they can become property if used to 
compose an imaginative work or create a new invention.280  The statutes 
regulating patent and copyright law provide the legal backbone for property 
rights in science and literature.281  Even this kind of intellectual property is 
a limited social construct to promote innovation, rather than a physical 
reality such as a man-made structure on a plot of land.282 
There is an ongoing debate as to whether cells are property,283 and one 
only has a claim to one’s personality or likeness if it is appropriated for 
profit, such as advertising in a person’s name.284  On the other hand, 
videotaping someone in public in itself would not impose on anyone’s 
 
275. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 95–96 (1998) (noting one is not required to hold 
property in fee simple to be protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
276. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding a 
person’s right of publicity may be violated not only by use of the person’s “name or likeness,” but also 
by impersonation). 
277. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990) (holding that while 
excised cells may be property in certain situations, their use for medical research does not support a 
conversion cause of action). 
278. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980) (holding manmade bacterium 
was patentable because it was the “product of human ingenuity”). 
279. For example, an invention must be patentable by fitting enumerated criteria.  
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
280. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 273, at 76–77 (explaining the value of intellectual 
property protections and describing their requirements). 
281. See id. (describing the purpose and requirements of obtaining a copyright or patent on one’s 
work). 
282. Id. 
283. See id. at 101–03 (discussing public policy considerations implicated if cells are recognized 
as property and the injustice that may result when they are not recognized as such). 
284. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (reflecting on 
the origin of common law publicity rights, namely the interest in exploiting one’s image for commercial 
gain). 
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property interest.285  Although the plurality of the Carpenter Court 
addressing the property rights issue did not proceed to address all of the 
property right possibilities exhaustively, it appears almost ludicrous to 
suggest a property right in one’s recorded movements. 
Another factor to consider is whether the terms and conditions supported 
Mr. Carpenter’s allegation that he had a property interest in CSLI.  There is 
no evidence that he had a contractual right to any of this through the cell 
phone company, even though the market provides many examples of the 
recognition of property rights in user data.286  Because Mr. Carpenter does 
not have a property interest in CSLI by statute, at common law, or by 
contract, it is time to move on to the final test for privacy rights under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Over the years, the Supreme Court has established 
that property ownership is not the only factor considered in deciding 
whether one has a Fourth Amendment claim.287 
D. The Majority in Carpenter Erred in Holding One Has a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy in CSLI Because One Voluntarily Conveys This 
Information to the Cell Phone Company 
What a person attempts to preserve as private may be protected by the 
Fourth Amendment under the REOP test.288  The first step in the analysis 
is whether Mr. Carpenter had a subjective expectation of privacy.289  Courts 
have often skipped over this step to the objective test because the subjective 
expectation of privacy is subordinate to the objective test.290  As harsh as 
the results of the law may indicate, Mr. Carpenter could not have had a 
reasonable subjective expectation of privacy.  By carrying the cell phone 
while it was on, Mr. Carpenter pinged any nearby cell towers as he went 
about his legitimate and criminal business.291 
Mr. Carpenter reasonably should have known that the cell phone, while 
it was on, had the capacity to make a call or receive a call whenever it was 
 
285. Cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (“A person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another.”). 
286. Cook, supra note 6 (recognizing customers’ privacy interest in their data). 
287. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967). 
288. Id. at 351–52. 
289. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
290. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 142, at 79. 
291. See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613 
(5th Cir. 2013) (“A cell service subscriber, like a telephone user, understands that his cell phone must 
send a signal to a nearby cell tower in order to wirelessly connect his call.”). 
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on.  To do this, the cell phone had to consistently connect to nearby towers.  
Nearly everyone who uses a cell phone understands this principle.  When a 
person enters a region with few cell towers, the reception decreases.  The 
quantity of cell reception bars registers to the user on the screen.  This 
affects the ability to make a call, the quality of a conversation, the ability to 
receive calls or messages, and the capacity to surf the Internet. 
Because Mr. Carpenter did not have a valid subjective expectation of 
privacy, he cannot succeed on a theory that he is entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection under the REOP test.  However, assuming 
for the sake of argument, as past courts have done, that Mr. Carpenter did 
have a subjective expectation of privacy, he still fails to pass the objective 
prong of the test.  There was originally a split of opinion as to whether the 
objective prong of the test, which is based on expectations “society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’”292 calls for a normative or empirical 
analysis.293 
Although the goal of the Katz test is to preserve normative expectations 
of privacy, the Supreme Court has weighed the extent to which a person 
exposes himself more heavily against the privacy proponent.294  In Katz, 
the type of exposure factored into the case’s outcome.295  Katz involved a 
man stepping into a phone booth.296  He could be seen through the 
transparent glass, but he sought privacy in his conversation; he reasonably 
anticipated being watched, and that aspect of privacy did not matter in the 
analysis.297  Thus, the objective prong of the test has been interpreted in 
more recent years as much more empirical than normative.298  In other 
words, what a person knowingly exposes to the general public is never 
protected by the REOP test.299 
 
292. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
293. Justice Gorsuch believes this matter is still undecided.  Carpenter v. United States, 
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2265 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
294. In other words, the fact that an individual is observed is often deemed evidence that an 
expectation of privacy was objectively unreasonable.  DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 142, at 77. 
295. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion). 
296. Id. at 348. 
297. Id. at 352. 
298. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 142, at 77. 
299. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
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For example, a person generally has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his physical movements.300  United States v. Knotts 301 is clear on this point 
and should have been applied in Carpenter.  In Knotts, police placed a 
“beeper” tracking device in a drum of chloroform, which was subsequently 
purchased and loaded into Mr. Knotts’s automobile.302  Police tracked the 
automobile and eventually found probable cause to arrest the man for 
crafting illegal methamphetamine.303  Because his physical movements were 
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who watched, he did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.304 
The fact that the empirically objective inquiry trumps the normative 
component is especially visible in California v. Greenwood.305  In that case, law 
enforcement sifted through the contents of a person’s garbage.306  The 
dissent noted how most people would be outraged to see someone looking 
through their garbage to uncover information about them.307  Indeed, 
garbage could reveal information about a person such as alcohol 
consumption, or whether an individual is affiliated with particular charities 
or organizations. 
The dissent in Greenwood recited the distress that renowned statesman, 
Henry Kissinger, underwent when the press published a report based on 
private notes obtained from their garbage.308  At the time, the State of 
California even had a law stating one has an expectation of privacy in 
garbage left for sanitation workers to collect.309  Despite all clues as to 
society’s normative expectations, the Court held there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in garbage placed at the street corner for 
collection.310 
 
300. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (holding one has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in movements on a public roadway). 
301. Id. at 276. 
302. Id. at 278. 
303. Id. at 278–79. 
304. Id. at 281–82. 
305. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
306. Id. at 37–38. 
307. Id. at 51–52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
308. Id. 
309. Id. at 43 (majority opinion). 
310. Id. at 41. 
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Likewise, people do not have a reasonable expectation in activities 
another can view from a public vantage point.311  In California v. Ciraolo,312 
a marijuana farmer “hid” his marijuana plants in his backyard.313  The plants 
were not viewable from the ground level due to fencing, which obscured 
the view.314  An anonymous source notified police, who proceeded to take 
an aircraft over the lot to verify the accuracy of the informant’s 
statements.315 
The police observed marijuana plants from above and arrested the 
grower.316  The grower argued he had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because it was unlikely that most casual observers would have noticed the 
marijuana plants.317  Nevertheless, the low probability of being detected did 
not matter to the Court, as the plants were still visible from a public vantage 
point.318  Because one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to 
information knowingly conveyed to the public, the third-party doctrine 
applied.319  
The third-party doctrine is best illustrated by Benjamin Franklin’s 
proverb: “Three men can keep a secret if two of them are dead.”320  One 
does not have an expectation of privacy in a conversation with one who is 
secretly a government agent.321  The criminal must fall on the sword of the 
false friend.322 
Likewise, as the background section pointed out, numerous exchanges of 
information from daily life fall under the third-party doctrine.  Whenever 
individuals drive to the store to buy groceries, their transactions generate a 
 
311. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (refusing to insist police avert their eyes 
from information derived from public vantage point). 
312. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
313. Id. at 209–10. 
314. Id. at 211. 
315. Id. at 209–11. 
316. Id. at 209–10. 
317. See id. at 211 (noting respondent’s argument that he did all he could to shield his activities 
from view). 
318. Id. at 213. 
319. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding the Fourth Amendment does 
not protect what is knowingly exposed to the public even in private areas). 
320. RHETORIC AND THE DISCOURSES OF POWER IN COURT CULTURE: CHINA, EUROPE, 
AND JAPAN 178 (David R. Knechtges & Eugene Vance eds. 2005). 
321. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (stating the law provides no protection 
to the criminal whose accomplice is a government agent). 
322. See id. (stating a defendant who distrusts their companions should discontinue their 
association or risk the consequences). 
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record of some kind.  If they pay in cash, they leave less of a footprint than 
if they pay with a credit card or a check.  Unfortunately, the technological 
footprint a person leaves is the price of living in the modern era, until 
legislation can catch up with the times. 
IV.    THE SOLUTION TO AMERICAN PRIVACY RIGHTS IS A COMBINATION 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROTECTIONS 
The Fourth Amendment continues to provide protection from numerous 
kinds of intrusion that the Framers envisioned, but existing doctrines 
provide little help for people in Mr. Carpenter’s position.  In 
Mr. Carpenter’s case, the use of a cell phone automatically transmitted CSLI 
to the cell phone company.323  Realistically, in a world of adhesion 
contracts, the average consumer will rarely set forth the terms of service 
with respect to data.  These contracts are “take it or leave it” in nature, and, 
more importantly, certain data cannot be deleted for business or regulatory 
purposes.  
The present incompatibility of technology and personal privacy does not 
make the third-party doctrine any less applicable. However, the reader must 
understand that the Fourth Amendment cannot resolve certain kinds of 
privacy intrusion.  There are so many more ways that privacy can be intruded 
upon in the modern age than existed at the time the Constitution was 
written. 
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court held that cell site data is qualitatively 
different than any other form of information, but again, the Court struggles 
to show that purchases or dialed phone numbers present any fewer privacy 
concerns.324  The Court’s decision inconsistently applies its precedents and 
incorrectly assumes that the writers of the Constitution intended the 
Fourth Amendment as a patch for all future privacy intrusions.  The Court 
thinly veils its application of natural law theory. 
Concern from the public should not have led to a judgment for 
Mr. Carpenter under subpoena law, the trespass doctrine, or the REOP test 
because the Court exists to interpret and apply the law dispassionately.  
Substantive outcomes are not the Court’s area of expertise, and to ensure 
the structural integrity of separation of powers, the Court should decline to 
make future Carpenter exceptions.  This conundrum begs the question of 
how the law should be changed.  Indeed, it is concerning that 127 days of 
 
323. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212, 2220 (2018). 
324. Id. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Mr. Carpenter’s data could become known by the authorities.  At the same 
time, the Fourth Amendment impedes certain types of unreasonable 
intrusion, but not others.325 
Danger follows the Court’s well-meaning attempts to protect the privacy 
of Americans.  What the courts may give the courts may also take away.  In 
times of great controversy, the rights of Americans are at the greatest risk.  
One recalls the attempts at mass surveillance following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.326  The meaning of the Fourth Amendment should not be 
amenable to either supplementation or erosion. 
Carpenter has the real potential to confuse the judicial system and law 
enforcement as it is unclear whether other forms of third-party owned 
electronic data will be singled out for a warrant requirement.327  There is 
no guidance on what other information fits within an exception to the third-
party doctrine.328  Likewise, it is a mystery why the Court creates an 
exception to its new warrant requirement for less than seven days of CSLI 
as opposed to a different metric.329  This case may be a unicorn among 
cases, but the existence of one of these cryptic exceptions raises the 
possibility that more will come to light.  Even though the Court stopped 
short of invalidating its third-party case law in Miller and Smith,330 these 
cases could be up next to be dismembered. 
Whether the dismemberment of the case law in Smith and Miller is good 
or bad, there are reasonable arguments to be made for allowing third-party 
information to be subpoenaed or for strictly curbing the surveillance 
apparatus.  The author believes in halting the surveillance state, but the 
solution eludes the wisest.  Americans see the writing on the wall regarding 
privacy and what will happen if society fails to answer the fundamental 
question of privacy rights.  One need only look to Europe to see a free 
society turned Orwellian.  In Britain, there are cameras on every street 
corner, and members of parliament advocate punishing those who view 
 
325. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) (concluding law enforcement would not 
run afoul of the Fourth Amendment in an open field even if they were trespassing); United States v. 
Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (elaborating that a driveway is not part of a house’s curtilage 
for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
326. Peralta, supra note 8. 
327. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
328. Id. at 2232. 
329. Id. at 2234. 
330. Id. at 2216–17 (majority opinion). 
40
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2020], No. 1, Art. 7
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss1/7
  
2019] COMMENT 263 
politically controversial videos online.331  Closer to home, the CIA spied 
on members of Congress and lied about it.332  The IRS has selectively 
targeted conservative and far-left organizations for disparate treatment in 
the past several years.333 
An out-of-control surveillance state is not a new problem in the 
United States.  The Church Committee in the 1970s uncovered misconduct 
by intelligence agencies during the Nixon presidency and earlier.334  As early 
as the 1930s, J. Edgar Hoover, the first director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, abused his power to spy on presidents and 
those with viewpoints disagreeable to him.335 
All of these factors show the importance of taking action.  The question 
remains as to what action should be taken.  Some have proposed the 
libertarian view of letting the free market provide solutions to privacy.336  
The issue with the libertarian view is that one is at the mercy of the market 
with no means of enforcing one’s privacy rights at law.  Modern 
libertarianism generally fails to account for the problem of “bad neighbors” 
in the marketplace who are so powerful that they are insulated from 
attempts at individual consumers ostracizing them.  Privacy needs a backup 
plan—just as the Uniform Commercial Code is a fail-safe for when private 
 
331. See Alan Travis, Amber Rudd: Viewers of Online Terrorist Material Face 15 Years in Jail, 
THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 2, 2017, 7:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/03/ 
amber-rudd-viewers-of-online-terrorist-material-face-15-years-in-jail [https://perma.cc/6Y6R-
RQPY] (describing British Home Secretary Amber Rudd’s plan to criminalize viewing far-right videos 
online among other materials deemed to be extremist); David Barrett, One Surveillance Camera for Every 
11 People in Britain, Says CCTV Survey, THE TELEGRAPH (Jul. 10, 2013, 6:30 PM), https:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/10172298/One-surveillance-camera-for-every-11-people-in-Britain 
-says-CCTV-survey.html [https://perma.cc/A2YB-VT2L] (discussing the ubiquitous closed-circuit 
television cameras in Britain). 
332. See Fenn, supra note 7 (referencing legal spying committed by the CIA). 
333. See Editorial, The IRS Targets Conservatives, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2013, at A14 (“Internal 
Revenue Service official disclosed for the first time . . . that the agency that wields the taxing power of 
the federal government has targeted conservative groups for special scrutiny during the 2012 election 
season.”). 
334. See S. REP. NO. 94–755, at 12–18 (Comm. Print 1976) (referencing government agency 
misconduct). 
335. See id. at 38–51 (exposing the FBI’s domestic surveillance and harassment of advocacy 
groups and civil rights leaders, media manipulation, threatening of controversial professors and writers, 
and reading American mail supplied by the CIA); Stephen Wm. Smith, Policing Hoover’s Ghost: The 
Privilege for Law Enforcement Techniques, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 244 (2017) (detailing Director 
Hoover’s wiretaps on “members of Congress, union officials, political activists, and civil rights and 
religious leaders.”). 
336. See GRAY, supra note 12, at 106 (demonstrating how consumer demand for products 
offering security pushes new technology advancements). 
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parties to a commercial agreement fail to reach a settlement outside of the 
courts.  In some cases, it may indeed be in a company’s best interests to 
protect consumer data privacy by resisting government acquisition of 
data.337  In other situations, a company may bend under the pressure of a 
major lawsuit.338 
In other countries, the banning or regulating of message encryption has 
caused many email encryption companies to go out of business, leaving their 
consumers without any privacy.339  The market-based solution may work 
in many cases, but it is still subject to being overridden by the state, and the 
law should provide some kind of safety net for when the free market fails 
to provide a solution. 
Another proposed solution may be to limit the implementation of new 
investigation or surveillance techniques without express statutory 
authorization.340  This is the law currently used in the European Union.  
This too seems to miss the mark of a privacy solution.  A blanket ban may 
provide for additional privacy until the next legislative session—a temporary 
delay at best—but in the interim, it may tie down law enforcement 
excessively. 
Yet another view is to judicially implement a normative expectation of 
privacy upon law enforcement and leave Katz largely untouched.341  Such a 
viewpoint is similar in many ways to the approach in Carpenter, except that 
the focus on technology is less relevant to the inquiry.342  Instead, courts 
would consider a number of factors, including social norms, the intent of 
law enforcement action, and whether a technique is particularly invasive or 
intrusive to the principles behind the Fourth Amendment.343  This 
approach will ultimately fail to preserve normative expectations of privacy 
because these norms can fluctuate in multiple directions.  It can also evolve 
 
337. See id. at 107 (highlighting Apple’s successful contest of FBI’s demand that the company 
write a program to circumvent security and encryption software on iPhones). 
338. See id. (“Google, Yahoo, and other major search engines receive thousands of demands 
each year for user information . . . .  Telephone service providers respond to thousands of demands 
each year from law enforcement agencies for information about users’ calls.”). 
339. See id. at 108 (discussing the rise and fall of encrypted email services such as Lavabit and 
Silent Circle). 
340. Freiwald & Smith, supra note 96, at 235. 
341. Reamey, supra note 135, at 237–38 (believing a more “holistic view of reasonable 
expectation of privacy” would be more “faithful” to Katz). 
342. See id. at 244 (discussing irrelevancy of “old” versus “new” technology). 
343. See id. (outlining relevancy of societies expectations, investigative intent, and intrusiveness 
of search). 
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in such a way that privacy guarantees shrink below what the Framers of the 
Constitution intended.  The law would be placed at the mercy of social 
scientists or the jurist’s own expectation of privacy.  The physical sciences 
are based on experimental data and patterns that can be recreated multiple 
times, yet entire theories are subject to constant revision; the social science 
fields have never enjoyed even that much mathematical certainty. 
The problem at hand may also be addressed provincially by each state in 
the form of new property laws.344  States could create property interests in 
electronic information.345  However, there still may be issues where based 
only on locally binding law, companies have the sole property right to 
customer information. 
The Supreme Court could impose quasi-property standards on 
transactions.  For example, in Katz, one could interpret the Court’s decision 
as recognizing a quasi-property principle in a phone call because the 
individual paid for the use of the phone, as well as the phone booth, and 
shut the door.346  One could argue that a Fourth Amendment 
quasi-property interest was created through an implied understanding that 
the phone company would honor the consumer’s privacy.  By paying for the 
service, Katz stepped into the shoes of the phone company that owned the 
phone booth.  When government agents trespassed on the company’s 
phone line by attaching a listening device, the interlocutor stepped into the 
shoes of the company and had a Fourth Amendment claim.  This 
quasi-property theory greatly stretches the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment and would enlarge the power of the judiciary. 
Lastly, some legal scholars believe in keeping the third-party doctrine as 
it is and allowing the common law and statutes to provide protections for 
individuals.347  This theory relies upon a mosaic of common law privileges 
such as attorney-client, priest-penitent, etc., as well as statutes to create a 
risk insurance plan for privacy.348  This ad hoc approach has some benefits 
in that the third-party doctrine aids law enforcement in the prosecution of 
crime, and the combination of common law and statutes impose certain 
 
344. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2270 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)  
(“If state legislators or state courts say that a digital record has the attributes that normally make 
something property, that may supply a sounder basis for judicial decisionmaking . . . .”). 
345. Id. 
346. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
347. See Kerr, supra note 197, at 565–66 (encouraging “nonconstitutional legal principles” to 
deter police harassment of third parties for information). 
348. Id. at 597–99. 
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limits.349  Its key defect is that the third-party doctrine will swallow up 
whatever privacy is not explicitly protected by law, and even the temporary 
privacy one has can be taken away by a later statute.  Meanwhile, judges are 
pressed into making often inconsistent value judgments about privacy to fill 
in statutory gaps between the public’s privacy expectations and what is not 
explicitly forbidden.  One does not have the assurances and permanence of 
a constitutional provision addressing matters technically outside of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
What is clear is that the Supreme Court’s value judgments on public 
policy escalate tensions and polarize the political sphere, since their 
precedents establish the forbidden fruit of public sentiment.  The anxiety 
and doubt of the public concerning the judiciary has reached a fever pitch.  
When Justice Scalia passed away, there was panic among conservatives that 
President Obama would redefine the country by shifting the philosophical 
balance on the Supreme Court.  Conversely, when Justice Kennedy retired, 
liberals were calling the occasion a national crisis.  A republic is largely built 
upon a foundation of faith in its institutions.  This should be restored by 
reining in the exercise of judicial power.  There is only so much that jurists 
in robes can do under Article III of the Constitution.350  The republic 
would be better served by resolving controversies such as privacy through 
the legislative branch. 
The proper approach to protecting and preserving privacy for the 
American people is a combination of constitutional and statutory change.  
It is hard enough to get an act of Congress passed, let alone a constitutional 
amendment.351  However, the hard road must be taken to test whether this 
republic can function.  If the judiciary takes a backseat, the demand for 
privacy will accelerate the action of legislative bodies. 
One factor to consider in the proposed course of action is that many 
statutes are already in place.  A patchwork of statutes is not a bad answer to 
complicated societal issues.  Congress has passed acts regulating stored 
communications and the use of pin registers.352  No solution to the privacy 
dilemma will be perfect.  It need only provide reasonable safeguards against 
government tyranny through oppressive surveillance.  For example, a law or 
 
349. Id. at 567–70, 596–600. 
350. See U.S. CONST. art. III (limiting judicial power to only those circumstances specifically 
mentioned in Article III). 
351. STORY, supra note 69, at xxix–xxx. 
352. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
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constitutional amendment could prevent the government from establishing 
a nationwide system of closed-circuit television cameras on every street 
corner, similar to the United Kingdom.  The government could still install 
security cameras on its own property, but it could not force private 
individuals to install cameras on the outside of buildings or otherwise 
cooperate in a surveillance scheme. 
In the case of Mr. Carpenter, the SCA provided some safeguards by 
requiring law enforcement to produce specific and articulable facts showing 
the information sought would be relevant to a criminal investigation before 
securing a subpoena to access Mr. Carpenter’s CSLI.353  Mr. Carpenter’s 
privacy rights could have been better protected by requiring police to not 
only establish probable cause, but also require the CSLI request be limited 
to a particular day in which the suspect is alleged to have committed the 
crime. 
Law enforcement did not have to ask for all 127 days of Mr. Carpenter’s 
information.  They ought to have asked for less data in case their suspicions 
of criminal activity proved unfounded.  It is small comfort to the innocent 
citizen that police invaded his privacy on a good faith belief.  It makes sense 
for legislation to impose a balancing test on the amount of electronic data 
authorities can access in a criminal investigation.  The circumstances of each 
case will govern whether more information is needed, but authorities should 
not be engaged in a fishing expedition that needlessly embarrasses law-
abiding citizens. 
A good model for future privacy legislation is the 
Federal Wiretapping Statute, which generally prohibits anyone from 
intercepting phone communications.354  The Federal Wiretapping Statute 
limits legal wiretapping to cases involving serious offenses, such as 
espionage or treason.355  The Statute also requires wiretap applications to 
specify whether alternative investigative means are unavailable or too 
dangerous,356 and the document must specify a duration.357  A court 
issuing a wiretap order may only do so if probable cause of a crime exists,358 
there is probable cause that the investigated party will reveal evidence of 
 
353. Id.; Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). 
354. 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 
355. See id. § 2516(1)(a) (listing other offenses including nuclear facility sabotage, kidnapping, 
protecting trade secrets, piracy, sabotage, malicious mischief, and riots). 
356. Id. § 2518(1)(c). 
357. Id. § 2518(1)(d). 
358. Id. § 2518(3)(a). 
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criminal activity,359 and normal investigative measures are either unavailable 
or too dangerous.360  Furthermore, a wiretap order has to terminate as soon 
as it is no longer needed.361 
The Federal Wiretap Statute provides for criminal penalties for illegal 
wiretapping,362 and the icing on the cake is that the individuals who 
wrongfully spy on others through illegal wiretapping can be sued 
individually for punitive damages and attorney fees.363  This kind of 
statutory scheme would go a long way toward rectifying the public’s privacy 
concerns in the area of stored electronic information.  Such a statutory 
approach to CSLI would go a long way toward protecting privacy. 
While statutory reform can impose important limits on technological 
intrusions not falling squarely into the Fourth Amendment’s purview, 
constitutional change should also be enacted as a fail-safe.  A constitutional 
amendment is a more permanent solution to privacy concerns because they 
are harder to repeal than statutory privacy protections.  Constitutional 
amendments supersede any government attempts to abuse power as long as 
the judiciary counterbalances them.  A privacy amendment should be broad 
enough that it need not anticipate all new technological innovations, and 
narrow enough that law enforcement is not crippled in its prosecution of 
crime.  Perhaps a privacy amendment would be worded like this: 
Neither Congress nor the States shall establish a system of pervasive 
surveillance or monitoring of the general public, nor shall any individual be 
subjected to prolonged technology-assisted surveillance or monitoring except 
as strictly tailored to the interests of justice on the showing of probable cause. 
Particularized suspicion must be required in a privacy amendment as a 
predicate for law enforcement to engage in prolonged technology-aided 
surveillance.  It is fine for law enforcement to engage in stakeouts.  The state 
does not have the resources to hire a person to watch every citizen at all 
times.  It is a different matter if the state actor is a computer and the state is 
indiscriminately spying on everyone’s online search history.  Privacy is the 
“right to be left alone,”364 and law enforcement should not be able to use 
 
359. Id. § 2518(3)(b). 
360. Id. § 2518(3)(c). 
361. Id. § 2518(5). 
362. Id. § 2511(4)(a). 
363. Id. § 2520(b)(2)–(3). 
364. Privacy, Right of, BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 2010). 
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advanced technologies to scan into homes or see into the bodies or chattels 
of law-abiding citizens.  Law-abiding citizens should not be tracked at all 
hours by cameras or drones without a warrant.  The government should be 
proscribed from imposing a system whereby all commercial transactions are 
tracked and society becomes effectively cashless.  Furthermore, a 
constitutional amendment ought to balance the interests of law enforcement 
and the public with a standard that is not too strenuous on criminal 
investigations.  
A constitutional amendment should resolve the problem that third 
parties’ ownership of private information presents.  The public rightly has a 
normative expectation of privacy concerning information shared with third 
parties in the course of daily life because there is a reasonable belief that the 
shared information will be used only in relation to the transaction.  For 
example, a credit card user does not expect that the company will look 
through the purchases and publish a profile of that customer by name to 
the highest bidder.  With that said, the customer understands that purchase 
information may be anonymized and sold, but this kind of limited privacy 
intrusion is a reasonable cost of doing business. 
For law enforcement to obtain private customer information without 
probable cause through a subpoena to a third party, law enforcement should 
first craft a request that is narrowly tailored to the interests of justice.  Law 
enforcement and government agencies should not be invited to a fishing 
expedition to trawl for information.  The State should also be prohibited 
from creating databases on all its citizens by way of purchasing data on the 
market. 
Statutes will fill in the gaps of an amendment.  For example, one could 
create new tort causes of action for invasion of privacy by companies or 
private individuals, as demonstrated by the Federal Wiretap Statute.  This 
would help in cases where a citizen does not endure prosecution, but still 
suffers an invasion of privacy. 
The government can and always will abuse its power or make mistakes 
that infringe on the rights of others.  However, an amendment to the 
Bill of Rights will provide an opportunity for the judiciary to step in and 
protect the people without acting as a quasi-legislative body.  The 
Fourth Amendment protects the public from some intrusions, but not 
others.365  The Constitution is sacred, and it is preferable to write a new 
chapter in this great work than to strain the words of the text; a new and 
 
365. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967). 
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comprehensive privacy amendment to protect the human dignity of all 
citizens is long overdue. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
Carpenter is a radical departure from established constitutional doctrine.  
It is a result-oriented opinion that confuses the law without settling it.  
Regardless of one’s personal views on privacy, no accepted legal framework 
can support the Court’s decision.  The State may lawfully subpoena any 
information owned by third parties, provided the request is not unduly 
burdensome. 
Mr. Carpenter was not searched under either of the Supreme Court’s 
search tests.  Because Mr. Carpenter did not own the CSLI, he cannot win 
under the trespass test.  Alternatively, Mr. Carpenter did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI voluntarily conveyed to the cell 
company by purchasing their services.  The third-party doctrine imposes 
serious challenges to privacy in the modern day.  It is unreasonable to insist 
that to have privacy, one must live a solitary life with the shades drawn. 
In the end, privacy is such an important societal good that privacy rights 
should be memorialized by a combination of constitutional change and 
statutory reform.  Alternatively, if the nation does not change the 
Constitution, some privacy protection by statute is better than nothing.  
However, with statutes or even the common law, what a legislature or 
judiciary can give, it can also take away.  The variability in the Court’s 
jurisprudence on privacy reveals this weakness. 
It would be best to formally impose nationwide limitations on how much 
data can be obtained in criminal investigations without a search warrant.  
Natural law and universal values of rights do exist, but the judiciary cannot 
impose them.366  The question is always whose version of natural law will 
apply, and for the purposes of a republic, the law “is not a brooding 
omnipresence . . . .”367  The normative privacy values shared by the 
American people are fundamental to liberty, yet they must be implemented 
through the legislative process enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
366. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring) (disputing the notion that 
the Supreme Court may strike down a law for violating natural law and noting even the wisest have 
disagreed on the matter of natural law). 
367. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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